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RECENT DECISIONS

charge involving moral turpitude because the majority of the
courts do not consider fraud an element of the charge.]1 They
have sometimes approached the problem as being one of whether
there had been conduct below the level of behavior of attorneys
and, if so, to what extent, for the purpose of determining the
gravity of the punishment.17 (Material in parentheses has been
added.)
STEPHEN
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SCHREITER

Attorney-Client: Compensation of an Attorney Appointed to
Defend an Indigent-Appellant, an attorney, was assigned by the
circuit court to defend one of three indigents charged with the murder
of a Wisconsin law enforcement officer. The jury trial of these three
Illinois residents, after a change of venue, consumed thirty-nine and
one-half days and resulted in the conviction of all three and sentences
of life imprisonment. After the trial, appellant applied to the court for
allowance of attorney fees and disbursements in the amount of
$18,486.55. This amount included $10,556.30 for services rendered
prior to the trial, $6,810.00 for services rendered during the trial and
$1,120.25 for disbursements. It was computed at $100 per day in trial
and $15 per hour in preparation. The circuit court refused to pay the
full amount requested on the grounds that the trial was unnecessarily
protracted and the amount of time spent in preparation was not reasonably necessary. The trial court allowed appellant a total of $6,500 without specifying how the amount was computed according to the various
services rendered and the disbursements. On the attorney's appeal from
the order, the supreme court awarded $1,120.25 for expenses in addition to the $6,500 awarded by the trial court.:
This case presented the supreme court with the problem of interpreting section 957.26 of the Wisconsin Statutes as it was amended by
Chapter 500 of the Laws of 1961. This statute provides for compensation for an attorney assigned to represent an indigent charged with any
felony. The amendment to the statute eliminated provisions for fixed
fees2 and directed that compensation be made "pursuant to §256.49,"
which provides that when any attorney has been appointed by a court,
the court shall
...fix

the amount of his compensation for the services and provide for the repayment of disbursements in such sum as the
16 47 KY.L.J. 256 (1959).
37 Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 1398
I2 Conway

(1958).

v. Sauk County, 19 Wis. 2d 599, 120 N.W. 2d 671 (1963).
"The county shall pay the attorney so appointed such sum as the court shall
order as compensation and expenses, not exceeding $25 for each half day in
court, $15 for each half day of preparation not exceeding 5 days, $15 for
each half day attending at the taking of depositions . . ." Wis. STAT. §957.26
(1959).
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court shall deem proper, and which compensation shall be such
as is customarily charged by attorneys in the state for comparable services.
In construing this language there is a wide range of possibilities:
for example, the amount of compensation could be based on the minimum fee schedule of the State Bar, a determination by the trial court of
what the average attorney would charge for the work done, a finding
of the amount the appointed attorney-because of his skill, standing
and experience-would charge, or perhaps on a percentage increase
over the old fixed fees.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not specifically select one of
these possible interpretations but rather indicated, in an opinion by Justice Fairchild, that the amendment to section 957.26 evidenced the dissatisfaction of the legislature with the adequacy of compensation provided for under the old fixed fee provisions and that "the legislature
accordingly authorized the appointing court to fix a fee which would
be fair and reasonable for the services reasonably necessary under the
3
circumstances."
The court further noted that in applying the statute it is necessary
that two elements be considered: the services necessary for an adequate
4
defense and the value of such services.
In discussing these elements the court pointed out that the trial
court, because of the unique opportunity the judge has to observe the
trial and the circumstances surrounding it, is allowed great discretion in
the determination of an allowance of fees. This allowance will stand
unless it is clearly unreasonable.
In approving the trial court's allowance, at least as the proper fee
for services rendered, the court rejected appellant's contention that the
schedule of minimum fees adopted by the State Bar should be controlling in the determination of fees. Its only relevancy to the issue was
held to be its value as some evidence of the reasonableness of the
charge for services. Testing the award here by the fee schedule, the
court found that the allowance was not clearly unreasonable.
The dissent, by Justice Hallows, expressed the opinion that the
minimum fee schedule should be the standard applied, after the factors
set forth in Canon 12 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the
American Bar Association were considered. 5
a Conway v. Sauk County, supra note 1, at 603, 120 N.W.2d at 674.
4 Ibid.
5The relevant portion of Canon 12 reads: "In determining the amount of the
fee, it is proper to consider: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty
and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill requisite properly to
conduct the case; (2) whether the acceptance of employment in the particular
case will preclude the lawyer's appearance for others in cases likely to arise
out of the transaction and in which there is a reasonable expectation that
otherwise he would be employed, or will involve the loss of other employ-
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In contrast to the definite standard favored by the minority of the
court, the fair and reasonable test that the majority advocates leaves
the trial court, after it has determined what services are reasonably
necessary, with the delicate task of determining what is a fair and reasonable amount to award in attorney fees.6
It is suggested that a reasonable fee would be one that is substantially more than a mere token payment, yet one that would be less than
a solvent client would be able to pay a retained attorney This would
divide the burden of providing counsel for indigents between the community and the Bar.7 That such a sharing can be supported in Wisconsin is seen by combining the thinking which underlies the legislative
amendments to section 957.26 increasing the compensation for assigned
counsel and the provision of the attorney's oath that he will "never reject, from any consideration personal to [him-]self the cause of the defenseless or oppressed ... "I'
This view is supported by recent decisions in two jurisdictions having "reasonable compensation" provisions in their statutes.'
The California decision emphasized the attorney's duty to the defenseless as the reason for not allowing the same compensation that
would be charged to a solvent client. As an aid in determining what
reasonable compensation would be, the California court said consideration should be given to the amounts awarded in other jurisdictions for
comparable services' 0 and the amount of money paid to public officials
ment while employed in the particular case or antagonisms with other clients;
(3) the customary charges of the bar for similar services; (4) the amount
involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the
services; (5) the contingency or the certainty of the compensation; and (6)
the character of the employment, whether casual or for an established and
constant -client. No one of these considerations in itself is controlling. They
are mere guides in ascertaining the real value of the service." Aii. JUL. 2d
DEsK Boox, Doc. No. 91, 225 (1962).
6 Wisconsin in 1859 held that even in the absence of a statute, an appointed
attorney defending an indigent is entitled to compensation from the county
for services rendered. Carpenter v. County of Dane, 9 Wis. 274 (1859). The
decision in that landmark case was grounded on the constitutional guaranty of
the right to be heard by counsel (WIs. CONsT. art. I, §87), the necessity of the
guiding hand of counsel to utilize the other fundamentals of a fair trial, and
that the people of the county have an interest in seeing fundamental rights
protected. Subsequent to this decision the legislature provided fixed fees for
compensation, and gradually increased the amount available and the scope of
services for which compensation would be allowed, including, time in trial,
time in preparation, time spent taking depositions and travel allowances.

OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
EQUAL
NEw YORK AND THE NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER AssocIATio,
JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED 90 (1959), recommends that such a sharing is
desirable.

7 THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE AssocIATION

(1961).
9 Hill v. Superior Court in and for the County of Humboldt, 46 Cal. (2d) 169,
293 P.2d 10 (1956) ; State v. Horton, 34 N.J. 518, 170 A.2d 1 (1961).
30 For a summary of the various state provisions see the appendix to EQUAL
JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED, supra note 7. There has been much criticism of
those jurisdictions that do not provide compensation for appointed attorneys.
s Wis. STAT. §256.29(1)
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charged with the duty of defending or prosecuting in criminal proceed1
ings.
The New Jersey court expressly approved of the reasoning and
conclusions of the California decision. The court succinctly summarized
the position suggested in this note:
However, the very fact that our scheme of compensation is
couched in indefinite terms rather than precise monetary figures
leads us to find an intent that the amount awarded should be
somewhat more than the mere token or honorarium appearing
to be the result in many states, even though the recompense
must be considerably less than what would be considered full
compensation were the accused able to pay. While the philosophy
of the assigned counsel system is founded on the basic obligation
of the bar to render gratuitous services to the indigent, legislative
authorization to make any recompense from public funds, especially where that authority prescribes a general standard keyed
to reasonableness, must necessarily rest on recognition that the
community too should assume some financial responsibility in the
matter and that the bar should not have to carry the whole load. 2
This sharing of the burden between the community and the Bar
does present a problem when, as in the instant case, the community
share of the burden must be borne entirely by one county. Here the
defense of three non-resident indigents cost Sauk County, with its
36,179 residents as of 1960, a total of $15,743 or slightly more than
forty cents per person. 13 It is suggested that, since a felony is actually
a crime against the state, the amount that a county be called upon to
supply in the form of compensation to appointed attorneys be limited
and any excess beyond the limitation be borne by the State.
RoCH CARTER
Attorney-Client: Privilege as Applied to a Corporate Litigant
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 43(a)-By virtue of
United States v. Becton Dickinson and Co.," a federal district court has
added a new interpretation to the already confused problem of determining the availability of the attorney-client privilege to a corporate
litigant in cases arising in federal courts. This case involves a civil
In view of this sharp criticism, this writer does not feel that these jurisdictions should be included in a comparison.
"Hill v. Superior Court, supra note 9, at 14. It is interesting to note that the
trial court in the Conway case "noted that the special assistant district attorney had been paid $6500 for his services and expenditures and concluded
that $6500 was fair and reasonable compensation for each defense counsel's
trial work, preparatory work and necessary expenditures." 19 Wis. 2d 599,
602, 120 N.W.2d 671, 673 (1963).
12 Horton v. State, supra note 9, at 8.
13 Brief for Appellant, pp. 118-119, Conway v. Sauk County, supra note 1.
1212 F.Supp. 92 (D.N.J. 1962).

